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RAZOR SLASHED PRICES: THE
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TO SALES FOR BELOW COST
DANIEL HUTTLE†
INTRODUCTION
Around the time of their eighteenth birthday, many young
adults are hoping to receive a car to use for the remainder of high
school into college or their careers. However, young men often
receive an unsolicited surprise gift of a new Gillette razor in the
mail around this time. While the benefit of a free razor to the
recipient is obvious, the direct benefit to the manufacturer is less
so. Besides the value as a marketing tool, the company can use
this promotion as a way to not only recoup the costs of the freely
given razor, but also profit in the long-term. This can be
achieved in the medium to long-term through the sale of the
compatible blade cartridges at a much higher price than they cost
to produce.
This strategy of selling goods or services is known as the
“metered” pricing model.1 This is also referred to as the “Razorsand-Blades” model which is sometimes incorrectly attributed to
King C. Gillette.2 The concept is that by selling an initial good or
service for a very low price, the universe of customers willing to
purchase the product increases.3 Any losses incurred from the
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Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.S., Computer Science, magna cum laude, 2010,
St. John’s University. I would like to thank Professor Jeremy Sheff for his
invaluable help and guidance with this Note.
1
Ricard Gil & Wesley R. Hartmann, Empirical Analysis of Metering Price
Discrimination: Evidence from Concession Sales at Movie Theaters, 28 MARKETING
SCI. 1046, 1046 (2009).
2
Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 227
(2011) (“The first [myth] is that Gillette invented razors-and-blades and gave away
or sold low-priced handles to sell high-priced blades.”).
3
See Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1.
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first transaction can be overcome by selling goods or services
needed by the initial product for a much higher price than they
cost to produce.4
In the original example, Gillette loses money on production
and shipping of the razor for free in the hope that the recipient
becomes a customer for blades—sold for much higher than the
cost to produce—in order to continue using the device. This is a
viable strategy assuming that Gillette has a patent on both the
razor and the blades, as no one will be able to compete in the
blade market for the duration of that patent. However, suppose
the blade is not patented, or the patent was later invalidated. In
that situation, absent some other patent protection, competition
in the market for blades would drive prices down to the cost of
production. This would prevent Gillette from recouping its costs
under this model, making it an economically unsound course of
action.
In LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC,5 the
Federal Circuit heard, in a matter of first impression, whether a
patentee should retain rights to control the use of a good
distributed for free in a manner similar to the Gillette example.6
The suit involved a method patent7 to test blood glucose levels for
LifeScan manufactures a product utilizing this
diabetics.8
method called the “OneTouch Ultra” blood glucose meter.9 In
marketing these meters, forty percent are sold for below cost and
sixty percent are distributed for free.10 The goal of this strategy
is to later profit from the sale of compatible test strips, which are
required to use the meter.11 Shasta manufactures a test strip
designed to work in the LifeScan meter, which led LifeScan to
file a civil suit.12 LifeScan claimed that Shasta committed

4

Picker, supra note 2, at 226.
734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
6
Id. at 1374.
7
A method patent, also called a process patent, protects “an operation or series
of steps leading to a useful result.” DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03
(Matthew Bender 2015). The other broad category of utility patents is for specific
tangible products including machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. Id.
§ 1.02.
8
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1363–64.
9
Id. at 1364.
10
Id. at 1365.
11
Id.
12
Id.
5
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contributory infringement13 by selling test strips designed to
work with its meters, which embodied their patented method of
testing blood glucose.14
Despite the lack of profit made on sales of the meters, the
Federal Circuit held that the policy of patent exhaustion applies
in circumstances where products are given away for free or sold
below cost.15 Patent exhaustion is a common law doctrine which
has historically stated that once a patentee has sold a patented
good for its full value, he loses the ability to control the use and
sale of that particular article on patent grounds.16 The concept of
the doctrine being applied to goods distributed for free—rather
than being sold—is a matter of first impression for the Federal
Circuit.17 The court expanded the doctrine to cover all transfers
of title, not just sales to purchasers for the full value of the
patented article.18 This holding is binding precedent in all
United States District Courts because, unlike most areas of law,
the Federal Circuit is designated by statute as the sole court of
appeals for patent cases.19
This Note addresses whether this expansion of patent
exhaustion is necessary or justified.
Part I provides a
background on the relevant doctrines and concepts implicated by
the LifeScan decision. This Part begins with a discussion on the
history and development of the patent exhaustion doctrine under
the common law. This Part also introduces the antitrust concept
of tying and how it relates to patent misuse. Part II considers
whether patent exhaustion should be applied to both goods
distributed for no cost and goods sold below the cost to produce.
Part III analyzes the anticompetitive potential of refusing to
extend patent exhaustion in both of these situations, and
discusses the application of the doctrine of patent misuse in

13
“The seller is liable as a contributory infringer if he knows that the
component is ‘especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent’ and if the component is ‘not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’ ” CHISUM, supra note 7, § 17.01.
14
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1365.
15
Id. at 1377.
16
See infra Part I.A.
17
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1374.
18
Id. at 1377.
19
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). Patent cases may only be initiated in United
States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
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such circumstances. Finally, Part IV analyzes a hypothetical
situation where the concerns created by the expansion of patent
exhaustion are put into sharper focus.
The Note concludes that the Federal Circuit’s extension of
patent exhaustion is not consistent with United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the matter. Further, this refocus on
transfers of title instead of sales for fair value causes problems to
the metered pricing model, which may lead to unintended harms
to both consumers and manufacturers of patented goods. Finally,
this Note argues that any anticompetitive results that might
arise from a failure to expand patent exhaustion in such a way
are mitigated by the existing doctrine of patent misuse. To
begin, the evolution of both patent exhaustion and patent misuse
must be discussed.
BACKGROUND ON THE RELEVANT DOCTRINES AND CONCEPTS

I.
A.

The Common Law Development of Patent Exhaustion

Generally speaking, obtaining a patent for an invention
“confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the claimed invention in the United States for a term
of . . . years.”20 A patentee may bring a lawsuit against anyone
who either directly or indirectly infringes upon any of these
rights under the patent.21
Under the common law doctrine of patent exhaustion, often
referred to as “first sale” doctrine, once a patentee has sold a
patented good he has exhausted his ability to control the use,
resale, or repair of the particular article.22 There are two general
public policies that justify limiting the general principle of patent
law in this way. First is the common law’s strong stance against
barriers to the free alienation of property.23 Second is the risk
that placing such conditions on trade may implicate antitrust
concerns.24 Since a patent infringement action can be sought
against anyone who knowingly contributes to the infringement of
20

CHISUM, supra note 7, § OV.1.
Id.
22
Id. § 16.03(2)(a).
23
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 493 (2011); see also
Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhausting Doctrine,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 492 (2010).
24
Rinehart, supra note 23.
21
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others—with no limitation from privity of contract—there can be
serious anticompetitive consequences if there were no such
restriction available.25
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bloomer v. McQuewan26 is
generally regarded as the origin of the patent exhaustion
doctrine.27 Chief Justice Taney framed the rights given by the
patent for a planing machine as a monopoly by the patentee, who
could share a portion of such monopoly with his licensees.28 The
Court held that a distinction exists between a licensee and one
who purchases a good whose only value is in its use from the
patentee in a lawful sale.29 Once such a sale occurs, the patented
article “passes outside of [the monopoly], and is no longer under
the protection of the act of Congress.”30
The Supreme Court refined the concept two decades later in
Adams v. Burke.31 This case dealt with a patent for coffin lids
where the patentee gave his licensee the right to manufacture,
use, and sell these lids in a limited geographic area.32 The
question presented to the Court was whether a purchaser who
had bought such a lid from the licensee within his region had the
right to use the lid in a burial outside of that region.33 The Court
held that even though the assignee had a limitation on the region
in which he was authorized to sell the lids, a purchaser of a
patented good whose sole function is its use has the right to use
the good regardless of any restrictions on an assignee.34 The
patentee no longer has the right to restrict the use of the good
when he has “in the act of sale received all the royalty or
consideration” for that good.35
Both Bloomer and Adams were further interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.36 There,
the patentee assigned the right to sell his patented folding beds
25

See Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 492.
55 U.S. 539 (1852).
27
Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on
Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 564 (2013).
28
Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 549.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
84 U.S. 453 (1873).
32
Id. at 456.
33
See id. at 457.
34
Id. at 456–57.
35
Id. at 456.
36
157 U.S. 659 (1895).
26
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within Michigan to an assignee.37
This assignee sold to
defendants a carload of the patented beds, which defendants
later took to Massachusetts to resell for their own profit.38 In
reversing the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court
held that a purchaser who purchases patented goods from
someone authorized to sell such goods gains an “absolute
property” right in the goods purchased, “unrestricted in time or
place.”39 This included freedom from restrictions on both use and
sale.40 The Court also explicitly stated that the patentee’s rights
are not deprived “because no article can be unfettered from the
claim of his monopoly without paying its tribute.”41
This justification for the limitation on the patentee’s rights
continued into the twentieth century. In United States v. Univis
Lens Co.,42 the purpose of the limited monopoly granted by patent
law was said to enable the inventor “to secure the financial
rewards for his invention.”43 The Court held that “the purpose of
the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article
when the patentee has received his reward for the use of his
invention by the sale of the article.” Therefore, there is no patent
law basis for further restraining the use of that particular
article.44 Even in its most recent case on exhaustion, the
Supreme Court still framed the discussion in terms of sale.45 The
Federal Circuit, save its decision in LifeScan, has also
consistently framed its discussions on exhaustion in this way.46

37
Standard Folding Bed Co. v. Keeler, 37 F. 693, 693–94 (C.C.D. Mass. 1889),
rev’d, 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
38
Id. at 694.
39
Keeler, 157 U.S. at 666.
40
Id. at 664.
41
Id. at 666–67.
42
316 U.S. 241 (1942).
43
Id. at 250.
44
Id. at 251.
45
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (“The
authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to
control postsale use of the article.”).
46
See, e.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“The theory behind [patent exhaustion] is that in such a transaction, the
patentee has bargained for, and received, an amount equal to the full value of the
goods.”).
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Patent Misuse in the Context of Antitrust Tying

Patent misuse47 arose under common law as a defense to
patent infringement when the patentee engaged in conduct
which constitutes “misuse” of the patent.48 To succeed on this
defense, the patentee must have “impermissibly broadened the
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect.”49
The doctrine of patent misuse was first adopted by the
Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co.50 This case involved a patented motion
picture projector which came affixed with a notice limiting its use
to only films which were authorized by the patent holder.51 The
Supreme Court struck down this restriction as invalid because
the film itself was not part of the patented invention of the
projector.52 In the eyes of the Court, to not strike down such a
provision would give “such a potential power for evil” that would
be “gravely injurious” to the public interest.53 To broaden the
patent right in such a way would be an unacceptable result,
completely outside “the scope and purpose of our patent laws.”54
The restriction imposed in Motion Picture Patents Co. is an
example of a “tying” arrangement. Tying is a term of art in
antitrust law describing an agreement to sell one product—the
tying product—on the condition that the purchaser also buys a
different product—the tied product.55 Until a 1988 amendment
to the patent infringement statute, the act of tying a patented
good to the sale of an unpatented staple product constituted per
se patent misuse.56 “[A] staple article is one that has substantial
non-infringing uses. A non-staple article is one which is specially
47
For the purposes of this Note, the discussion of patent misuse is limited to its
application to the antitrust concept of tying. Patent misuse is a broad concept which
applies to many other types of activities which are not relevant to the discussion
here.
48
CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.04.
49
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
50
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
51
Id. at 505–06.
52
Id. at 518.
53
Id. at 519.
54
Id.
55
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
56
Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the
Tie?,” 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–2 (1991).
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made or adapted for use in infringement of a patent and which
has no substantial non-infringing uses.”57 The rationale behind
the judicially created per se rule against tying was grounded in
an attempt to restrict patentees from using their rights to gain
an unfair advantage in the marketplace of goods beyond the
scope of the patent.58
The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 added, in relevant
part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any rights
to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.59

This action by Congress limited the original rule against tying to
only apply if the patentee has “market power” in the market of
the tying product.60 When determining the existence of market
power, the existence of the patent is relevant to the analysis but
is generally not in itself sufficient to presume that market power
exists.61 “Market power is determined by whether the seller has
the power ‘to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms
such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of
buyers within the market.’ ”62
Another area where tying arrangements have historically
constituted patent misuse is in the context of contributory
infringement actions.63 This situation often arises when a third
party manufactures component parts designed specifically for use
in a patented device or machine.64 The specific design of these
57

THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 11.02 (2015).
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
59
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
60
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.3a1 (CCH Inc., 2014).
61
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2 (CCH Inc., 2010).
62
Burchfiel, supra note 56, at 28 (quoting Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969)).
63
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2.
64
Id.
58
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parts to work with the patented machine, as opposed to a part
common to an entire class of devices, makes the part a nonstaple
good.65 The Supreme Court has held that a patentee misused his
patent by attempting to control third-party sales of component
parts, even nonstaple goods, for use in the patented device.66
Additions made in the 1952 Patent Act67 served to reverse
these decisions and restrict the boundaries of patent misuse.68
This amendment allows a patentee “to require its licensees to
purchase non-staple goods only from it, and to sue makers of
those non-staple goods for contributory infringement, without
liability for misuse.”69 Further, the patentee is permitted to
enforce his rights against contributory infringers without concern
that such an action would be a misuse of his patent right.70
With this introduction to the long histories of both patent
exhaustion and patent misuse, the applicability of these
doctrines to the LifeScan case can now be discussed. First, the
Federal Circuit’s holding that patent exhaustion applies to all
transfers of title needs to be examined.
II. PATENT EXHAUSTION SHOULD NOT APPLY TO GOODS SOLD
BELOW COST
There are two major concerns arising from the Federal
Circuit holding that goods distributed for free or sold below cost
are subject to patent exhaustion as authorized transfers of title.71
First, this expansion of patent exhaustion doctrine is not
consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
doctrine.72 Second, such a harsh rule may present unanticipated
negative effects on both consumers and patentees.73 These two
issues demonstrate that such an expansion might not be a

65

Id.
Id.; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
67
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012).
68
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2.
69
Id.; see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980)
(rejecting a patent misuse defense for a third-party seller of an unpatented,
nonstaple chemical whose sole use is in the patentee’s method for treating weeds).
70
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012).
71
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
72
See infra Part II.A.
73
See infra Part II.B.
66
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prudent course to take, especially in light of the availability of
existing patent misuse doctrine to prevent anticompetitive acts
that may result from failing to expand patent exhaustion.74
A.

The Federal Circuit’s Expansion of Patent Exhaustion Is Not
Consistent with the Prior Precedent of the Supreme Court

When discussing transactions that trigger an exhaustion of a
patentee’s rights, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have
consistently framed the requirements as an authorized sale to a
purchaser for fair value or consideration.75 The Federal Circuit’s
decision in LifeScan adds two additional categories of
transactions to the definition: goods distributed for free and
goods sold for below the cost of production.76 To expand the scope
of exhaustive transactions to anyone in which title is transferred
redefines the entire concept of such a transaction. While the
category of goods distributed for free has a stronger argument
that patent exhaustion should not apply, both categories
ultimately lack consistency with the historical development of
the doctrine.77
The first requirement to trigger exhaustion of the patent
right—that a “sale”78 occurs—is not met for goods distributed for
free. This requirement is so fundamental to a qualifying
transaction that patent exhaustion is also known as the doctrine
of “first sale.”79 By plain meaning of the word sale, one does not
consider a freely given good to have been sold. This is true even
by the legal definition of the word, meaning “[t]he transfer of
property or title for a price.”80
It is possible that the reason the Supreme Court used the
term “sale” is that the Court never had the opportunity to hear a
patent exhaustion dispute regarding transfers of title in a
74

See infra Part III.
See supra Part I.A.
76
Freely distributed meters constituted sixty percent of all transfers of title in
that case, while the remaining forty percent were sold below the cost to produce.
Both categories of transaction were held to exhaust the patentee’s rights. LifeScan,
734 F.3d at 1365, 1377.
77
It was for this reason that the true focus of analysis for the Federal Circuit in
LifeScan was on the freely distributed meters.
78
See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, (2008);
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S.
453, 456 (1873).
79
CHISUM, supra note 7, § 16.03(2)(a).
80
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (10th ed. 2014) (definition of “sale”).
75
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patented article without cost. While that may explain why the
Court has not expanded the definition of patent exhaustion, it
does not change the fact that the Court’s 150 years of
jurisprudence on the matter has consistently required a sale to
occur. This means that any decision that alters that definition by
a lower court—even one with so unique a position as the Federal
Circuit81—should be heavily scrutinized.
A similar result is reached when discussing the second
requirement, that the recipient be a “purchaser.”82 Under the
same plain meaning consideration, it is not common usage to
refer to the recipient of a free good as a purchaser. The legal
definition agrees, describing a purchaser as “[s]omeone who
obtains property for money or other valuable consideration; a
buyer.”83 In light of both plain meaning and the legal definition,
it is difficult to justify calling the recipient of a freely distributed
good a purchaser. Once again, the Supreme Court would be in
the best position to decide whether to extend its standard for
exhaustive transactions to not require a purchaser.
In contrast to goods distributed for free, the concepts of sale
and purchaser do fit a transaction where the good was sold for
below cost. Such an exchange involves a vendor that sells the
good for a price in money, despite that price being less than the
cost the vendor incurred to produce that good. By paying a price
in money for the property, the recipient is also within the
definition of a purchaser. However, in both freely distributed
and below cost transactions, the third requirement is
problematic.
Unlike “sale” and “purchaser,” the third requirement for an
exhaustive transaction is less clearly defined than the other two.
The Supreme Court has referred to this in earlier cases as when
“the patentee . . . received all the royalty or consideration”84 or “a
valuable consideration.”85
The Federal Circuit itself has
interpreted this as meaning “the patentee has bargained for, and

81
The Federal Circuit is the sole court of appeals for patent cases arising from
any United States District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
82
See, e.g., Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895);
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
83
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (10th ed. 2014) (definition of “purchaser”).
84
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
85
Keeler, 157 U.S. at 661.
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received, an amount equal to the full value of the goods.”86 The
rationale for this requirement is that patent exhaustion limits
the right of the patentee to control a sold patented article
because the patentee has received his reward under patent law
for the article sold.87
To hone in on what full value means in light of this
rationale, it is important to consider the overarching goals of
intellectual property law and patent law. The predominant
theory justifying intellectual property protection is utilitarian in
nature.88 In the open market, the only reason an inventor would
invest the time and money necessary to develop a new invention
is if the profits to be made exceed those initial costs.89 However,
once the idea behind the invention is discovered, competition will
drive costs down to their marginal cost, preventing the inventor
from recouping the costs of developing the invention.90
Intellectual property law lessens this outcome, encouraging
others to invent new products by giving them the tools to prevent
others from copying them, which increases the chances of both
recouping costs and profiting on the initial investment.91 Since
increasing the likelihood of an inventor recouping research and
development time as well as eventually profiting are the aims of
the system of intellectual property laws, patent exhaustion
doctrine should be consistent with those goals.
The next step is to see if application of patent exhaustion
when a good is sold below cost sacrifices this goal on individual
articles in order to promote the free alienation of property. To
determine if this “full value” of the goods has been received by
the patentee, two timeframes need to be examined. First, the
value received at the time of the transaction must be determined.
In addition to that, any value that may be acquired
posttransaction as a result of the transaction must also be
considered.

86

B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
88
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed. 2012).
89
Id. at 12.
90
Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and
Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 841 (2007).
91
Id.
87
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At the time of the transaction—whether it concerns a good
distributed for free or one sold for below cost—it cannot be said
that the full value of the article has been received absent some
consideration of future profits. If the article was distributed for
free, no monetary value was gained at the time of transaction.
This cannot be said to have granted the full value of the article
without going into needlessly subjective analysis over the good
feelings received by the patentee.92 The same can be said for the
value if the good is sold for below cost. If the price paid for the
article is less than its cost to produce it, for each transaction the
patentee would be losing the difference between the two prices.
If, at least at the time of transaction, each sale causes the
patentee to lose more and more money, the goal of increasing
likelihood of profitability can hardly be said to have been met at
this point.93
If the full value of the patented article has not been received
at the time of the transaction, there must be some
posttransaction reward that justifies applying patent exhaustion.
Looking to the introductory example of giving away razors to
make profit on the blades, that would constitute such a scenario
in theory, as the blades are sold at a higher profit margin than
the razors. However, there is a potential problem with this
method in practice. Assuming a competitor enters the market for
the profitable blades, the price of the blades would be reduced via
competition towards the marginal cost to produce them, which
would destroy the ability of the seller to both recoup his
investment and eventually profit.94 This would lead the seller to
default back to selling the initial good at a much higher price
instead, which, as discussed later in this Note, causes potential
problems for both the seller and prospective buyers.95

92
Cf. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (holding that under contract law, a
promise to a close family member that would make the promisor feel better does not
constitute consideration).
93
Katz, supra note 90.
94
See id.
95
See infra Part II.B.
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To prevent this outcome, the seller would need some way to
block competitors out of the market.96 If both the razor and the
blades were patented, the patentee would be able to use his right
to exclude others from selling the patented good to prevent the
competitor from entering the market for the term of the patent.97
However, the situation changes if only the original, below-cost
good is patented, while the profitable good is not. These were the
circumstances surrounding LifeScan, where the blood glucose
meter was found to embody the method patent but the profitable
test strips did not.98
In the situation where the profitable good is not patented,
whether the full value of the good is received to justify patent
exhaustion depends, ironically, on whether patent exhaustion is
applied. If patent exhaustion does not apply—assuming the
patent is not being misused99—the patentee can file suit against
the competitor for contributory infringement of its patent for
selling the profitable good to be used with the patented good.100
This would lead the patentee to getting the full value of the good.
However, if patent exhaustion does apply, the original concern of
a competitor driving down prices to their marginal costs occurs,
preventing the full value of the patented good from being realized
postsale.101
There is a real consistency problem when comparing the
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on patent exhaustion
with the proposed expansion by the Federal Circuit. For goods
distributed for free, there is no sale, purchaser, or full value
received for the article if exhaustion is applied. While there is a
sale and a purchaser for goods sold for below their costs to
produce, such a sale would not give the full value of the article if
96
Picker, supra note 2, at 226. Professor Picker also mentions loyalty as a way
to profit off the sale of the blades; however, the focus of this Note is limited to
whether the value of the goods can be attained without some level of patent
protection due to exhaustion.
97
CHISUM, supra note 7, § OV.1 (“A patent confers the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the claimed invention in the United States for a
[specified] term . . . .”).
98
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
99
See infra Part III.
100
Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 492 (“By contrast [to contracts, which are
limited by privity], infringement actions can run against all who infringe an IP
right, and even those who knowingly contribute to the infringements of others.”).
101
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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exhaustion was applied to limit posttransaction value received.
If after applying exhaustion the requirements of the doctrine are
not met, its application cannot be justified in these types of
circumstances.
B.

The Expansion of Patent Exhaustion Has Likely Negative
Effects for the Marketplace

In addition to the inconsistencies with the history of patent
exhaustion jurisprudence, the LifeScan decision will likely have
unintended consequences for the market. The Federal Circuit
stresses that the patentee has a choice for how to secure the
reward for his invention.102 As a result, the patentee cannot use
the failure to gain a reward resulting from the choice to
distribute a good for free to circumvent patent exhaustion.103
However, in expanding exhaustion in such a way in order to
prevent public harm by patentees asserting control over the
purchaser’s use of the product, there is the risk of potential
harms to both patentee and the end consumer.
The most obvious harm by expanding patent exhaustion is to
the patentee. The problem is that the patentee is deprived of his
rights in the patent monopoly of the article without receiving the
full value of the article.104 While the Federal Circuit argues this
is the patentee’s choice,105 there are legitimate business reasons
to go about such transactions that can have benefits to both the
patentee and the consumers in the market.
To properly analyze this situation, the concept of metered
pricing must be examined. The metered pricing model works by
selling an initial good or service below market price, usually at or
below the cost to produce or provide the good or service, while a
secondary good or service that is required to use or enhances the
use of the original product is sold for a premium.106 The most
commonly cited example is razors and razor blades, where the
razors are given away or sold very cheaply in order to create a
market for razor blades, which are required to use the razor,
need to be periodically replaced, and are sold at a large profit

102
103
104
105
106

LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1375.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1375.
See Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1.
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margin.107 The costs that are incurred by distributing the razors
so cheaply are recouped and then exceeded by subsequent sales
of the blades.108 Modern examples using this sales model include
printers with ink, e-book readers with e-books, video game
consoles with games, and movie tickets with concessions.109
This concept of metered selling has the ability to increase
efficiency for the seller.110 Take the example of movie tickets and
high concession prices.111 Due to the high prices, only a subset of
consumers will purchase concessions, but each of those sales will
be highly profitable.112 Absent these highly profitable concession
sales, the movie theatre would likely need to raise ticket prices in
order to maintain the same profits.113 This would cause some
customers to be “priced out of the market,” leading to less total
volume of customers. By lowering the up-front cost, more total
customers will purchase tickets, with higher profits extracted
from the subset of customers that purchase the higher priced
concessions.114
By applying patent exhaustion to goods distributed for free
or sold below cost as a per se rule, the model breaks down.
Absent some level of patent protection, the patentee will be
unable to prevent competition from lowering the price of the
secondary product to the cost of production.115 This consequence
disincentivizes the patentee from using a business model that
can simultaneously promote efficiency by increasing the total
universe of available customers for the seller and increasing
access to the good for buyers116 and increase the likelihood of the
patentee profiting from his invention.

107

Picker, supra note 2, at 226.
Id.
109
Id.; see also Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 1046–47.
110
Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1.
111
Id. (using a similar scenario to explain the concept).
112
See id.
113
Id.
114
See George Anders, Inside Amazon’s Idea Machine: How Bezos Decodes
Customers,
FORBES,
Apr.
23,
2012,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeanders/2012/04/04/inside-amazon/
(“Amazon’s
selling price [for the Kindle Fire tablet] of $199 [does not] appear to cover costs.
[Founder and CEO Jeff] Bezos [is not] perturbed. . . . If it induces owners to buy
more from Amazon, the costs of spreading these tablets globally will be well worth
it.”).
115
Picker, supra note 2, at 226.
116
Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 1046–47.
108
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If the metered pricing model is disincentivized as a result of
such an expansion in patent exhaustion, patentees are not the
only group who would be harmed. Consumers in the market
would also face indirect harm as a result. One of the advantages
of metered pricing to consumers is that the initial cost of the
initial good or service involved is lower.117 This reduced up-front
cost has the ability to “open access of a good to customers that
would otherwise be priced out of the market.”118
Going back to the movie theatre example, if concessions were
unable to be priced at a premium, in order for the theatre to
maintain the previous profit margins the price of tickets would
have to be increased to even higher than they are today.119 This
increase would lead to fewer customers buying tickets for movies,
which would in turn lead to fewer customers purchasing the
This outcome is not beneficial for
concessions as well.120
consumers either, as they will likely see fewer movies as a result,
and when they do go to the movies, they will need to pay a higher
price for their ticket.
The same result would occur in other examples: more
expensive printers with low priced ink, marked up e-book readers
with cheaper e-books, and exorbitantly priced video game
consoles with more affordable games. This sort of result may
benefit some high frequency users, but the average user of any of
these products would be less likely to pay the up-front costs due
to being priced out of the market.
Patent exhaustion does not fit well when applied to goods
distributed for free or sold below cost. There are consistency
problems with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as well as
unintended harms for both buyers and sellers in the
marketplace. At its core, patent exhaustion is the balance of
several principles. On one side is the promotion of invention by
increasing the ability of an inventor to profit from his invention
via the limited monopoly over it.121 On the other side are two
principles. The first is the general public interest in the free
alienation of property.122 While reducing the burdens on innocent

117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id. at 1046.
See id.
See id.
Rinehart, supra note 23, at 490.
Id. at 492.
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purchasers is important,123 doing so at the cost of losing public
access to the new technology due to higher prices makes it less
so.
In order to justify an expansion of the doctrine, it would need
to be in furtherance of the second competing goal, reducing the
anticompetitive effects of postsale restrictions.124 However, the
existing doctrine of patent misuse is more closely tailored to
fulfill this need in circumstances where a patented good is sold
below cost with the goal of profiting from a related unpatented
good.125 The existence of a body of law which better fits the
circumstances raised in the Federal Circuit’s decision to expand
patent exhaustion demonstrates how unnecessary this expansion
is.
III. PATENT MISUSE WILL BETTER LIMIT THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO APPLY PATENT
EXHAUSTION TO GOODS SOLD BELOW COST
In its LifeScan decision, the Federal Circuit expressed
concerns about the potential impact on market competition
resulting from a failure to expand patent exhaustion to goods
distributed for free.126 Permitting LifeScan to conduct business
in this way “would be akin to allowing a tying arrangement” that
would prevent purchasers from using competing test strips.127
The court cites to Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co.128 to bolster its concerns.129
While the concern that LifeScan would leverage its patent on
the meter to gain an unfair advantage in the test strip market is
certainly legitimate, this neither requires nor justifies an
expansion of patent exhaustion. Instead, this issue points
towards an existing solution that originated in Motion Picture
Patents Co. itself: the doctrine of patent misuse. There are two

123

Id.
Id.
125
See infra Part III.
126
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Rejecting a claim of exhaustion in this case would be particularly
problematic because LifeScan would be permitted to eliminate competition in the
sale of the strips even though the strips do not embody the claimed invention and
are themselves not patentable.”).
127
Id.
128
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
129
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1373.
124

FINAL_HUTTLE

2015]

7/11/2016 6:09 PM

RAZOR SLASHED PRICES

1389

tying concerns to address here. The first is whether requiring a
purchaser to use LifeScan’s unpatented test strips in order to
purchase their blood glucose meter is patent misuse. The second
is whether it constitutes patent misuse for LifeScan to seek
contributory
infringement
actions
against
competitors
manufacturing test strips compatible with their meters.
A.

Requiring Use of Unpatented Test Strips To Purchase
LifeScan’s Blood Glucose Meter Did Not Constitute Patent
Misuse

To prove that the tying of a patented good to an unpatented
tied good constitutes patent misuse, one must demonstrate that
the two products are indeed tied, the tied product is a staple
good, and the patentee has market power in the market of the
tying product.130 Using the LifeScan facts, it is apparent that a
sales model such as LifeScan’s alone likely did not constitute
patent misuse and, therefore, was within the “physical or
temporal scope” of the rights granted by the patent in the
meter.131
First, it must be determined if the transaction between
LifeScan and its customers constituted a tying arrangement.
There are two alternative possibilities for details of the
transaction, each of which would point to the existence of a tie.132
If LifeScan had formed contracts with its customers to require
them to purchase its test strips at the same time as receiving
their meters, and would not give or sell the meters without also
selling the test strips, this would fit the classic tying scenario.133
However, even if the contract specified that purchasers could
only use LifeScan’s test strips with the device, and did not
require purchase at the same time, that would constitute a tie for

130

See supra Part I.B.
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
132
It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit itself acknowledges that the
situation is similar to a tying arrangement. LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1373 (“Allowing
LifeScan to control sale of the strips would be akin to allowing a tying arrangement
whereby the purchasers of the meters could be barred from using the meters with
competing strips.”).
133
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60 (“In patent cases, this classic form of tying
involves the insistence by a patent owner that those who would license the patent
(or purchase a product covered by the patent) must purchase a separate product not
covered by that patent from the patentee.”).
131
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purposes of patent misuse.134 In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co.,135 the Supreme Court held that requiring purchasers of a
patented machine for depositing salt tablets into cans to
purchase the staple salt tablets from the patentee constituted
patent misuse.136 Therefore, even absent an express contract
making the sale contingent on the simultaneous purchase of an
unpatented staple good, just requiring the future purchase of
that staple is sufficient to constitute tying in the context of
patent misuse.
Second, it must be determined whether the test strips
constituted a staple good. In the context of patent misuse, a good
is a nonstaple good if its sole substantial use is in connection
with the patented invention, while a good is considered a staple if
it has commercial uses other than those related to the patent.137
This is a fact-finding determination that was not made in the
LifeScan decision, but one may be able to impute an answer from
the determinations made by the court in its exhaustion analysis.
The feature that enabled these test strips to work with the
meter was that there were two electrodes instead of one, and one
was downstream of the other, which would enable better
determinations of errors in detecting blood glucose levels.138
During the course of prosecution of the original patent with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the concept
of a biosensor containing multiple electrodes was determined to
be disclosed in the prior art.139 This prior art disclosure caused
the patent examiner to reject the claims on the test strips
themselves, although the method patent for the process of
examining blood glucose was allowed.140 The Federal Circuit
asserted, in its exhaustion analysis, that “[t]he fact that the prior
art strips might have required some reconfiguration to use with
LifeScan’s meters is irrelevant.”141

134

See id. (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)).
314 U.S. 488.
136
Id. at 491. This decision predates the addition of the market power
requirement to find such a tie.
137
VAKERICS, supra note 57.
138
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1369–70.
141
Id. at 1373.
135
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While the level of modification the prior art would need to
undergo to be compatible with LifeScan’s meter was not relevant
to the Federal Circuit’s decision, it is highly relevant in
determining if Shasta’s strips constituted a staple good. The
existence of test strips with multiple electrodes in the prior art
increases the likelihood that a court would find Shasta’s strips as
staple goods, but the analysis does not end there. In the entire
existing market for test strips, only some portion of them have
the multiple working electrodes required by the LifeScan
meter.142 Even then, these multiple electrode test strips lacked
the proper layout to be compatible with LifeScan’s meter.143 With
this being the case, a court could find that the test strips
produced by Shasta lacked “substantial non-infringing uses.”144
Shasta’s strips could be considered a nonstaple good as they were
designed to work specifically with LifeScan’s meters, which
suggests that the strips lack any noninfringing use.145
Prior to the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, the analysis
would have ended there with a determination of whether there
was per se misuse or not.146 However, Congress explicitly limited
the original common law rule to add the additional element of
market power in the tying good as a requirement to finding
patent misuse; therefore, an additional inquiry must be made to
complete the analysis.147
It is important to note that market power in this case is not
defined as monopolistic power, which would be the gathering of a
large amount of market power.148 Instead, market power exists
when a firm has the power to charge more than the marginal
costs by reducing output in such a way that the rest of the
market would be unable to replace.149

142

See id. at 1363–64.
See id. at 1373 (suggesting that existing prior art strips with multiple
electrodes would require reconfiguration to be used with LifeScan’s meter).
144
VAKERICS, supra note 57.
145
LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1365.
146
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60.
147
Id.
148
Id. § 4.1.
149
Id.
143
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According to market research in 2008, LifeScan was one of
four competitors who, combined, controlled 89.7% of the market
in self-testing blood glucose meters.150 It is not necessary that
LifeScan possess the majority of market share, or even the
largest piece of market share to be said to have market power.
Instead, the test is whether its output reduction would reduce
market-wide output in such a way that rivals would not be able
to quickly replace the lost volume.151 While it is possible that the
competitors in the market would be able to replace
approximately a quarter of the total market with increased
production, it is unlikely that one would consider this an
“inconsequential” impact on the market price.152 Also, since
LifeScan does own the patent to its improvement on the meter,
one can impute some amount of market power from this as
well.153 However, it is important to note that any finding of
market power may not solely be the result of the existence of the
patent.154 Given both the ability to manipulate prices and the
existence of the patent, it is likely that LifeScan would be
determined to have market power.
Under this analysis, LifeScan’s requiring use of the
unpatented test strips in order to receive the glucose meter
embodying their method patent would not constitute patent
misuse because the test strips did not constitute a staple good.
The remaining question is whether an attempt by LifeScan to
prevent the sale of this nonstaple product constitutes patent
misuse.
B.

Preventing Competitors from Selling Compatible Test Strips
Likely Constitutes Patent Misuse

In earlier versions of the patent misuse doctrine, the
Supreme Court held that a patentee could misuse his patent by
attempting to control the sale of component products used in a
patented invention even if they were nonstaple products.155 This
150
Mark D. Hughes, The Business of Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose: A Market
Profile, 3 J. DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1219, 1221 (2009). LifeScan is the second in the
market with 27.2% market share, with the market leader controlling 30.8%. Id.
151
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 4.1.
152
Id.
153
Id. § 3.2.
154
Id.
155
Id. § 3.3a2 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)).
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would cause a situation like the one in LifeScan to fall firmly
within patent misuse; just the act of suing Shasta for
contributory infringement would remove liability from Shasta for
the act of contributory infringement itself.
Congress restricted the doctrine by passing the 1952 Patent
Act, which included changes reversing these decisions156 by
setting the edge of the patent misuse doctrine to where
contributory infringement began.157 This amendment added two
sections to the statute.
First, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) defined
contributory infringement as producing or selling components of
patented devices or methods.158 To be liable as a contributory
infringer, the part being sold cannot be “a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use.”159 Second, the amendment added, in relevant part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce
his patent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement . . . .160

One example of an application of the new amendment to a
case dealing with contributory infringement is Dawson Chemical
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.161 There, the Supreme Court heard a
case dealing with the unpatented chemical, propanil.162 This
chemical, although known for some time, did not constitute a
staple good because it had no use other than practicing the

156
157
158
159
160
161
162

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012).
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 271(d)(1)–(3).
448 U.S. 176 (1980).
Id. at 185.
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plaintiff’s patented method of use as an herbicide.163 The Court
held that under the statute, excluding defendants from selling
the nonstaple good did not constitute misuse.164
Under Dawson Chemical, attempts by LifeScan to prevent
Shasta from producing compatible test strips would appear to not
constitute patent misuse. Test strips compatible with LifeScan’s
meter would likely not constitute staple goods because there
would be no noninfringing use of a test strip specifically designed
to work only with LifeScan’s meters, which embody its patented
method of blood glucose monitoring.165 Similar to the herbicide
propanil, the only use for the Shasta strips was in connection
with LifeScan’s patent. Therefore, in a vacuum, a court might
find that LifeScan did not misuse its patent here.
However, Shasta’s best argument is the prosecution history
of LifeScan’s patent. LifeScan sought a device patent on the test
strips themselves, but was denied due to disclosures in the prior
art.166 By attempting to use the method patent to prevent others
from manufacturing competing test strips, LifeScan is
attempting to broaden their patent to cover the unpatentable
strips as well. This attempt to expand the scope of the method
patent to cover unpatentable devices would likely be found to
have “impermissibly broadened” the patent right in a way that
misuse doctrine seeks to prevent, barring LifeScan from
recovery.167
One final consideration is whether filing a contributory
infringement action in and of itself would constitute patent
misuse in these circumstances. The Supreme Court cases before
the 1952 Patent Act held that this action did constitute misuse.168
This amendment to the statute added, in relevant part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right

163
164
165
166

Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 223.
See supra Part III.A.
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir.

2013).
167
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
168
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)).
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by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: . . . (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement . . . .169

This amendment prevents any finding of patent misuse for the
sole reason of a patentee attempting to vindicate his rights
against an infringer or contributory infringer.170 Therefore,
under this new framework, LifeScan would not be found to be
misusing its patent by filing a contributory infringement suit
against Shasta for producing compatible test strips for its blood
glucose meters.
In sum, LifeScan would likely be found to have misused the
patent on its blood glucose meter. While Shasta’s actions in
specifically designing their competing test strips to work
specifically with LifeScan’s meter is probative, LifeScan
attempting to use their method patent to get around the PTO’s
decision to reject their device claim for the strips is more so.
Under these facts, LifeScan “impermissibly broadened the
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect.”171 Despite the outcome being the same,
applying patent misuse provides a more fine-tuned analysis of
potential anticompetitive issues. This is especially true in
situations where patented goods sold for below cost are tied
together with higher profit unpatented goods, rather than the
LifeScan court’s adoption of a per se rule expanding patent
exhaustion.
IV. CASE STUDY: EXAMINING THE PROBLEMS OF EXPANDING
PATENT EXHAUSTION
The LifeScan decision might be considered a situation where
easy cases make bad law. After all, the court could have instead
relied on Lifescan’s attempt to expand its method patent to cover
a device which the PTO decided was not patentable to reach the
same result. However, to put the potential ramifications of the
Federal Circuit’s decision into sharper focus, a hypothetical
scenario raising these concerns is warranted.

169

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012).
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2.
171
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
170
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A group of recent Ph.D. graduates in the fields of computer
science, physics, and engineering worked together as part of their
doctoral thesis. Together, they invented a novel approach to
optical media far superior to currently available CD, DVD, and
Blu-Ray technology. CD and DVD players utilize a red laser to
read information off of the disc as it spins, while Blu-Ray readers
can use a more efficient blue laser to read all three forms of
media.172 This group has invented a process for using ultraviolet
lasers to play all three formats, as well as a new format called
UVD. This new process enables older formats to be read faster
than with red or blue lasers, as well as allowing the use of the
new UVDs, which only works with ultraviolet readers and can
store vastly greater amounts of data, while still maintaining
faster speeds than any existing optical format.
The group obtains a method patent for the process of reading
all four formats using ultraviolet lasers, with such a use not
being disclosed in the prior art. The scientists form a company,
UV Inc., for the sole purpose of manufacturing and selling both
UVD players as well as UVDs. They find that the components
needed to produce their players and discs are roughly equivalent
in price to those required to make modern Blu-Ray players. In
order to break into the firmly established Blu-Ray market, UV
Inc. decides to sell their players for significantly below cost.
Their goal is to establish themselves as a simultaneously cheaper
and superior alternative to the older formats in order to recoup
their short-term losses in the UVD market, which are priced well
above costs similarly to Blu-Ray discs. UV Inc. also includes a
term in its license agreement that the purchaser of a UVD player
cannot play UVDs that were not produced by UV Inc. or one of its
licensees with the player. If a third party came into the market
for UVDs, would UV Inc. be unable to hold them liable for
contributory infringement of its method patent after the LifeScan
decision?
To answer this question, it must be determined if the sale of
the UVD player would exhaust UV Inc.’s patent rights. In
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,173 the Supreme Court
held that for a method patent to be exhausted by the sale of a
good, the good must be “capable of use only in practicing the
172
Elizabeth Armstrong, DVD Lasers: Why Blue Beats Red, WIRED (June 1,
2002, 12:00 PM), http://wired.com/2002/06/dvd-lasers-why-blue-beats-red.
173
553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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patent” and must have “embodie[d] essential features of [the]
patented invention.”174 Here, the UVD by its design can only be
read by a device utilizing an ultraviolet laser, for which UV Inc.
has a patent.
The Court also held that a device substantially embodies the
essential features of a method patent when “the only step
necessary to practice the patent is the application of common
processes or the addition of standard parts.”175 Here, the patent
is practiced with the addition of any existing optical format,
including standard CDs, DVDs, and Blu-Ray discs. Since, under
LifeScan, the sale requirement is fulfilled via the transfer of title
instead of a sale for the full value of the good,176 the sale of the
UVD player would be considered an exhaustive transaction.
Since the transfer of title in the player is exhaustive, a
third-party producer of UVDs would not be liable as a
contributory infringer even though the actions of UV Inc. did not
constitute patent misuse. Two of the elements required to
constitute patent misuse are missing: the tied good being a staple
good and market power.177 The functionally tied UVDs would not
constitute a staple good because they have no substantial use
except in connection with UV Inc.’s patented process for reading
them.178 Also, under the circumstances described above, UV Inc.
lacks market power, as they are a new startup company. All of
this points to there being no anticompetitive problem with the
hypothetical situation above, but it is still blocked by the newly
expanded patent exhaustion doctrine.
Public policy would seem to favor not applying exhaustion in
this case. If the third-party competitor were allowed to enter the
market without fear of contributory infringement, the price of the
UVD discs would be reduced to their marginal costs.179 This
would have negative impacts on both buyers who would have to
pay substantially more for the device in order to get slightly
cheaper media, as well as UV Inc. who would be unable to both
build a customer base while also recouping on their
174
Id. at 631–32 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249–51 (1942)).
175
Id. at 633.
176
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
177
See infra Part I.B.
178
VAKERICS, supra note 57, § 11.02[6].
179
Katz, supra note 90.
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investment.180 This is not a result of a misuse of the patent or an
attempt to claw back on claims rejected by the PTO like in
LifeScan. The only result here is that a third party who did not
put in the monetary and human capital to develop a new
beneficial process is able to profit off of the efforts of others to the
detriment of the inventors and the portion of the public who
would be priced out of the market. These are but some the
potential unintended consequences of using the ax of an
expanding patent exhaustion doctrine rather than the scalpel of
patent misuse.
CONCLUSION
Patent exhaustion has a long and rich history in the common
law, dating back over 150 years. The expansion of the rule
advocated by the Federal Circuit is concerning because it does
not appear to be consistent with that long and storied history.
By broadening the concept of sales to purchasers for full value to
any transfer of title, the court does not sufficiently maintain the
balance between public interest in the free alienation of property
and the fundamental goals of patent law. It could also end up
harming consumers in the marketplace for such goods by causing
patentees to abandon metered pricing and instead charge full
value at the offset for their patented goods, which can price some
consumers out of the market for these goods. Finally, any
concerns about expansion of the patent monopoly by failing to
expand the patent exhaustion doctrine are better resolved via the
existing doctrine of patent misuse. This is true both with regards
to tying arrangements in sales to consumers and seeking to
exclude contributory infringers from entering the market of
nonstaple goods. If such an expansion of patent exhaustion is
indeed necessary, such a move should come from the Supreme
Court overturning its own prior precedent, not the Federal
Circuit on its own.

180

See infra Part II.B.

